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associations). Instead, our interview data expose hitherto hidden fractures in the 
employers’ camp. Employers’ representatives express –in varying degrees– their 
scepticism towards the efficacy of the institutional changes and generally towards 
technocratic solutions. More broadly this analysis reflects on the contested and 
controversial nature of the policy reforms on wage setting, for which there is no 
consensus either in the academic or policy literature, and delves deeper into the views 
and perspectives of key actors on the efficacy and consequences of the main 
institutional changes in wage setting. 
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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Social Partners and Reforms in the Wage-
setting System in Greece under Austerity 
 
1. Introduction 
Labour market regulation is considered an important aspect of a country’s overall 
regulatory framework due to its impact on working conditions and employment 
outcomes. In the context of the European Union (EU), Member States retain a degree 
of regulatory competence within national labour market frameworks (with the 
exception, of course, of areas where harmonising instruments, such as the EU Equality 
Directives or the Directives on information and consultation rights and health and 
safety, have established common rules). The approach adopted in the 2000s was 
underpinned by the Open Method of Coordination (see, among others, Mosher and 
Trubek, 2003), whereby Member States were expected to engage in policy transfer and 
policy learning. Yet following the advent of the crisis, this voluntarist approach to 
structural reforms of the labour markets was radically transformed. 
The EU promoted a programme of labour market re-regulation, in which the stated aim 
was to rework the mix of labour market institutions to best reconcile economic 
competitiveness and social solidarity (Clasen et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the policy 
emphasis within the context of this flexicurity approach was on “flexibility” rather than 
“security” (Heyes and Lewis, 2014). To that end, the EU started issuing annual Country 
Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to each member-state in response to their National 
Reform Programmes (NRPs). As a result, many Member States were prompted to 
review and reform their employment relations and labour market regulatory 
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frameworks, as a mechanism of adjustment to the recession and as a stepping-stone to 
increased competitiveness (Geary, 2016; Molina, 2014; Pedersini & Regini 2014; 
Rosário Palma Ramalho, 2014). According to a review by Clauwaert (2014), the CSRs 
issued in 2014/15 urged eleven countries to review wage-setting mechanisms and align 
them with productivity developments, while eight countries were expected to adjust 
their employment protection legislation (EPL) systems. 
Although the choice of phrasing in the CSR guidelines seems to allow the possibility 
of reforming wage-setting systems through a social partnership context, the general 
direction of travel points towards an outright decentralization of wage-setting 
institutions. The rationale behind these policies reflects a crude conceptualization of the 
labour market, according to which the wage floor is considered a rigidity, incompatible 
with the efficient functioning of the market, and trade unions are, primarily, “rent-
seeking” actors. Yet several authors argue that the policy case for deregulating the 
labour market is not borne out by studies that examine the relationship between various 
aspects of labour market institutions (such as the collective bargaining system) and 
labour market performance, as the empirical evidence remains inconclusive (Baccaro 
and Rei, 2007; Baker et al., 2005). 
Within this turbulent political and economic context, Greece constitutes an interesting 
case study. Faced with an unprecedented sovereign debt and economic crisis at the end 
of 2009, the country was one of the first in a series of EU Member States to seek 
financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. A Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) was subsequently signed, which prescribed detailed policies that Greece was 
required to adopt with a view to entering a path of economic recovery and 
competitiveness. Contrary to other EU countries (such as Portugal, Spain and Cyprus) 
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that also entered into similar agreements, the MoUs implemented in Greece included 
very detailed provisions regarding the deregulation of the country’s labour market and 
employment relations’ framework. 
This paper aims to critically examine the changes, prescribed by the MoUs, in the 
regulatory framework governing wage determination, through an analysis of the social 
partners’ views of these policies. In doing so, it will complement existing literature that 
has so far focused on the effects of the policies on several labour market outcomes (e.g. 
Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Baker et al., 2005; Boeri and van Ours, 2013; Christopoulou 
and Monastiriotis, 2014; Daouli et al, 2013; Theodoropoulou, 2016). Additionally, it 
will extend the literature that examined institutional changes and trade union responses 
to austerity (e.g. Campos Lima & Artiles, 2011; Geary, 2016; Ioannou, 2012; 
Koukiadaki and Kokkinou, 2016; Molina, 2014; Pedersini & Regini, 2014; Wood et al, 
2015). 
Our analysis is based on a series of single person face-to-face interviews (or group 
interviews) with key informants from peak representative associations (GSEE, SEV, 
GSEVEE, ESEE, SETE) 1  and relevant agencies and institutions (the Ministry of 
Labour, the Labour Inspectorate (SEPE) and the Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED)). The fieldwork took place during July and August 2016.2 
                                                 
1 GSEE: General Confederation of Greek Workers; SEV: Hellenic Federation of Enterprises; GSEVEE: 
The Hellenic Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen & Merchants; ESEE: National Confederation 
of Hellenic Commerce; SETE: Greek Tourism Confederation. 
2 Thirteen interviews were conducted, the total duration of which was 19.5 hours, with an average 
interview duration of 1.5 hours. All the interviews were digitally recorded and were subsequently 
transcribed into more than 220 pages of interview transcripts. Prior to the data collection, the King’s 
 6 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following two sections set the context 
of the study, by briefly discussing the policy context in relation to the relevant literature 
and the changes the MoUs introduced in the wage-setting system. The fourth section 
examines the positions and the views of the social partners on the reforms of the wage-
setting system and analyses their differing views. The final section provides an overall 
summary and concludes. 
2. The Policy Context: Internal Devaluation, Collective Bargaining and 
Competitiveness 
In May 2010, the first of a series of Memoranda of Understanding was signed between 
the Greek government and the so-called ‘Troika’ (EU Commission/ECB/IMF). The 
main aim of the first MoU was to establish institutional and fiscal rules that would help 
the country recover from the fiscal crisis it faced. An important aim of the MoU, among 
others, was the recalibration of the employment relations’ institutional framework – 
both in the public and private sectors – to drive down labour costs and realign them 
with productivity. Competitiveness, in that sense, would be achieved through a process 
of internal devaluation, since the country – as a member of the Eurozone – could not 
rely on an independent monetary and exchange rate policy. 
The logic of internal devaluation was based on two assumptions: first, that in recent 
years, the growth of nominal wage costs had exceeded productivity growth (leading to 
an increase in unit labour costs), making the country less competitive in the export 
                                                 
College “Social Science and Public Policy, Humanities and Law” Research Ethics Subcommittee 
reviewed our project and provided full approval for the commencement of the fieldwork (REC Ref. 
Number: LRS-15/16-2967). 
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markets; second, that for wages to be downwardly adjusted, a radical transformation of 
the existing employment relations framework was required. The then existing 
framework was considered too strict and obstructive to change, so a process of 
recalibration, along the lines of further flexibility in the labour market and of 
decentralization of collective bargaining, commenced.  
The prevailing discourse of the period emphasised the beneficial effects of deregulation 
on competitiveness and, consequently, employment. Yet the fact of the matter is that 
evidence in support of this claim is, at best, inconclusive. First, international 
competitiveness is not first and foremost related to wage/price competitiveness 
(Fagerberg, 1988; 1996; Fagerberg et al., 2007; Dafermos and Nikolaidi, 2012). 
Moreover, the negative relationship between unit labour costs and export performance 
seems to be mostly driven by the productivity element of the former (Decramer et al., 
2016). This is why even the European Central Bank’s economists (Altomonte et al., 
2013) seem to be sceptical about the usefulness of the usual wage/price competitiveness 
indicators. Second, several authors (Baker et al., 2005; Howell et al., 2007; Baccaro 
and Rei, 2007) have argued that the policy case for the deregulation of the labour market 
cannot be borne out by the various studies that examine the relationship between 
aspects of labour market flexibility, on the one hand, and labour market performance, 
on the other. Reflecting the above evidence, the following quote from IMF economists, 
who discuss IMF’s advice on collective bargaining for the advanced economies, is quite 
telling:   
“This being said, the implications of alternative structures of collective bargaining are 
poorly understood [emphasis added]. This suggests that the IMF should tread carefully 
in its policy advice in this area, particularly since governments may have limited ability 
to reform existing systems. Moreover, trust among social partners appears to be just as 
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important in bringing about macro flexibility as the structure of collective bargaining.” 
(Blanchard et al., 2014: 20). 
Moreover, theories that stress the imperfect nature of labour markets point to the 
efficiency enhancing effects of institutions and legislation related to pay determination 
and employee representation (Agell, 1999; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Gregg and 
Manning, 1997). Inefficiencies arising from monopsonistic/oligopsonistic situations, 
transaction costs and externalities, mean that institutional and legislative regulation can 
lead to better outcomes in terms of quantity and quality relative to an unregulated labour 
market. For example, in a monopsonistic situation, both the equilibrium wage and 
employment are lower than the optimal level. Collective bargaining and minimum wage 
legislation in this case can lead to both higher wages and higher levels of employment 
(Gregg and Manning, 1997). By the same token, trade unions can also have a beneficial 
“voice” effect (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Dissatisfied employees that are unionised 
are more likely to express their dissatisfaction to their employer than opt for the 
“voiceless” option of exiting the firm. This enables the development of long-term 
relationships between firms and employees and the investment in firm-specific skills 
through continuous training (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Howell, 2005) that can 
ultimately have a positive effect on productivity, firm performance in general, and the 
quality of working life for individual employees (e.g. through increased job security).  
Nevertheless, and despite the inherently problematic character of the policy arguments, 
the MoUs that were signed in 2010 and 2012 introduced a series of radical changes in 
the Greek employment relations’ framework. These have been analysed in detail 
elsewhere (Karamessini, 2012; Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012; Kornelakis and 
Voskeritsian, 2014), but a brief description of the changes pertaining specifically to the 
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wage-setting regulatory framework is a necessary prelude to the discussion that will 
follow.  
3. Institutional Changes in the Wage-Setting System: An Overview  
The changes in the institutional framework of collective agreements and wage 
determination were gradually introduced into the existing framework. As discussed 
above, they were motivated by the need to align wages to productivity. One of the key 
changes as part of labour market reforms that affect the function and structure of 
collective bargaining related to the so-called ‘principle of favourability’, which was 
abolished. In a nutshell, the pre-crisis institutional framework suggested that 
sectoral/industry-wide collective agreements minima should not be set below the level 
set by the national minimum wage, whereas company-level agreements’ minima could 
not be set below that of sectoral agreements. In the case of cumulative application of 
different agreements (συρροή συμβάσεων), the one most favourable to employees 
would apply. 
More specifically, Law 3899/2010 and then Law 4024/2011 “Regulations of Collective 
Bargaining” enacted the following institutional framework:  
a) the possibility of signing company-level agreements with non-trade union 
representative bodies termed “Associations of Persons (AoPs)” (ενώσεις 
προσώπων); 
b) the possibility of concluding company-level agreements for enterprises which 
employ fewer than 50 employees (which used to be covered by sectoral 
agreements); 
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c) the suspension of the “favourability principle” (αρχή της ευνοϊκότερης 
ρύθμισης) for as long as the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy is in effect (i.e. until 
2015),3 and the primacy of company-level collective agreements over sectoral 
agreements in the case of cumulative application; 
d) the suspension of the “extension principle” (αρχή της επεκτασιμότητας) of 
coverage of sectoral and occupational collective agreements. 
Due to the structure of the Greek employment relations system, wage determination 
was heavily dependent on the level of the national minimum wage (NMW) – which 
was agreed through social dialogue between the peak-level social partners – and which 
consequently set the basis for the level of wages that would be agreed at sectoral and 
occupational level. Another important feature of the system was also the inclusion of 
an erga omnes principle. The principle stipulated that a sectoral collective agreement 
that was signed between a trade union and employers or employers’ associations that 
represented at least 50%+1 of the workers in the respective sector, was applicable to all 
workers in the sector through a process involving the issuing of a ministerial decree. 
Although the law provided that the competent Minister of Labour would confirm that 
the aforementioned condition was satisfied, in practice the terms and conditions of 
almost every sectoral agreement were automatically extended to all workers in the 
sector. 
The Troika’s policies focused on weakening these two aspects of the wage-setting 
system. First, it sought to reduce the grip of sectoral agreements on firms that were not 
                                                 
3 Article 37 (5) and (6) Law 4024/2011.  
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members of the signatory employers’ association. Second, it sought to change the level 
of the NMW that “set the pattern” for the determination of wages at sectoral, 
occupational or company levels. 
With the exception of a short lived attempt, in 2010, to disentangle the determination 
of wages at the company level from the ones negotiated at the sectoral level - through 
“special” company-level agreements 4  - the government eventually introduced new 
legislation in 2011 (Law 4024/2011), which permitted company-level collective 
agreements to include terms and conditions of employment less favourable than those 
agreed at sectoral level. Effectively, the law “froze” the erga omnes and favourability 
principles, and led to a collapse of the wage bargaining system manifested by the 
dramatic decrease of sectoral agreements and the de facto decentralization of 
bargaining. This trend is documented in Table 1. 
Table 1: The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining, 2010 – 2015. 
Year Sectoral and occupational collective 
agreements 
Company level collective 
agreements 
2010 65 227 
2011 38 170 
2012 23 976 
2013 14 409 
2014 14 286 
2015 12 263 
Source: Greek Ministry of Labour, modified from Koukiadaki & Kokkinou (2016: 212).  
                                                 
4 For more details on the short-lived arrangement of the Special Operational Collective Agreement 
(SOCA), see Kornelakis and Voskeritsian (2014). 
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The changes were put in place with a view to introducing structural flexibility in the 
determination of wages. Although the law explicitly envisaged that the temporary 
suspension of these principles would have effect only for the duration of the Medium 
Term Fiscal Strategy, in practice the suspension remains very much in force. 
4. Wage-Setting System Reforms and the Social Partners’ Perspective 
4.1. Decentralization of Collective Bargaining  
The responses of the social partners to the de facto decentralisation of collective 
bargaining were variable and this section will seek to document the fault lines and 
hidden fractures in their perspectives. An interesting fracture was observed in the 
employers’ camp. The views of SEV – which represents big businesses and heavy 
industry – and the views of ESEE and GSEVEE – which represent artisans, commercial 
enterprises, and small businesses, were diverging. ESEE and GSEVEE seemed to be 
more supportive of the sectoral collective bargaining, because of the economies of scale 
and transaction costs minimization and the avoidance of a “race-to-bottom” in wages 
and working conditions. SEV, in contrast, although supportive of sectoral collective 
bargaining, clearly indicated that company level agreements should take precedence 
over sectoral agreements: 
"We believe that the company level Collective Agreements (CAs) should prevail [i.e. over 
the sectoral CAs], as every business is aware of its own strengths, and knows the level 
of wages [it can afford]. If there is no company level [CA], then there could be coverage 
from a sectoral CA. In line with this rationale, we are of the view that a company level 
CA should be allowed to deviate from a sectoral CA when a company cannot survive or 
cannot follow its course." (Interviewee SEV, 29/7/2016). 
A similar position was expressed by the SETE interviewee: 
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"…On the one hand I believe that the institution of the company level [CAs] should 
continue to exist, but in parallel with the sectoral [CAs] – we have proved that we are in 
favour of sectoral CAs – and [the company level CAs should] prevail over the sectoral 
CAs, simply because in some companies the conditions could be such that allow for 
better wages – and this is the case in some sectors and in some companies – as it can 
also be the case that special conditions may not allow this, and reduced wages may be 
required for the company to survive." (Interviewee SETE, 29/8/2016). 
Although the previous framework allowed a company level collective agreement to 
derogate from a sectoral one, this could only happen if and only if terms and conditions 
of employment of the former were more favourable than the latter’s. What our 
interlocutors argued, however, is that such a derogation should be permitted 
irrespective of the content of the company level collective agreement compared to the 
sectoral one (i.e. as is the case under the current framework). Interestingly enough, 
GSEVEE considered such an approach as deviating from European best practices: 
"The one diverging from European practices is the one who, on the one hand, wants 
national CAs but does not want sectoral CAs and wants company level CAs. Why is that 
so, though? Could it be because it [i.e. the employers' association] represents companies 
and not sectors?" (Interviewee GSEVEE, 4/8/2016). 
The conflicting views over the structural hierarchy of collective agreements are 
founded on the social partners’ concerns about the survival and profitability of 
enterprises. Those representing sectors of the economy where very big or very flexible 
businesses operate are in favour of further wage flexibilization – to better reflect the 
labour cost demands of the specific businesses. The company level agreements, 
therefore, become a tool to undercut the perceived inflexibility of the sectoral 
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agreement, as has been shown in sectoral cases such as telecommunications 
(Kornelakis, 2016). 
In contrast, those representing very small businesses, or businesses where the ties 
between an employer and an employee are traditionally very strong (as is the case of 
commerce), favour sectoral bargaining. As our GSEVEE interviewee vividly argued: 
"A sectoral CA, which is signed by an employers' association and a [sectoral] trade 
union, certainly represents the sector's interests much better than an Association of 
Persons or a single employer could do." (Interviewee GSEVEE, 4/8/2016). 
4.2. New Structures of Representation 
The new framework achieved a recalibration of power allocation in the employment 
relationship, by allowing companies to determine their employees’ wages without 
depending on the provisions agreed at the sectoral level. However, an apparent problem 
concerned the issue of representation. Due to the structure of the Greek capitalist 
system (with more than 90% of companies employing fewer than 20 employees) and 
the legal requirement for a minimum of 21 members for the establishment of a trade 
union, a pragmatic complication became apparent. Up until 2011, a firm-level 
agreement could only be signed by either a company level trade union or a local sectoral 
(or occupational) union. What happened, then, in cases where such bodies did not exist 
or could not have existed due to the company’s small size? As we saw in the previous 
section, to resolve this practical problem, Law 4024/2011 introduced a new potential 
actor in the collective bargaining process: the so-called Association of Persons (AoP). 
The AoP can be established in any company – irrespective of size – and has the power 
to sign a collective agreement with the company’s management, as long as it represents 
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3/5 of the company’s employees. Thus, a collective agreement can now be signed 
without the need to include trade unions in the process. 
The AoPs are, perhaps, one of the most contested ‘innovations’ of the new regulatory 
framework. Although their declared raison d’ être was to extend the reach of collective 
bargaining to companies in which the exercise of such a right was hitherto impossible 
due to their size, in reality they functioned as a Trojan Horse for a redistribution of 
power in the employment relationship. AoPs may have been given the power to 
negotiate collective agreements, but they do not enjoy any of the other rights afforded 
to established trade unions. Thus, they have no right to strike, their members are not 
protected (as trade unionists are) vis-à-vis authoritarian managerial practices, and their 
membership may include managers or employers (in breach of a fundamental principle 
of free trade unionism, whereby only employees or workers may be members of a trade 
union). As a consequence, they are particularly vulnerable to adversarial managerial 
behaviours. As our interlocutor from the Labour Inspectorate colourfully stated: “I 
regard [the collective agreements signed by the AoPs] as ‘self-enforcing agreements’” 
(Interviewee Labour Inspectorate, 25/7/2016). Our GSEE interviewee further clarified 
and supported this view: 
"Currently, 99.9% of the established AoPs are instruments controlled by the employers. 
Those participating in them are primarily business executives, managers. It is forbidden 
for managers and employers' representatives to participate in trade unions. In the AoPs 
we observe that, in most cases, the vast majority [of members] are executives [who 
enjoy] the employer's immediate trust. Therefore, what kind of trade union 
representation can we be talking about with these constructs? The employer has five 
executives found an AoP and they sign a custom-made CA to fit [the employer's] 
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purposes; they then, later, impose it on the rest of the staff who may not agree with it but 
do not have the ability to react" (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016) 
This dependency on the employer is problematic in its own right, both with regard to 
the quality of collective bargaining and in terms of its outcomes. The Labour 
Inspectorate interviewee, for instance, argued that “[t]here exist company-level 
collective agreements that go so far as to stipulate individualised wages for every single 
employee", while there are several examples of how this institution has been abused by 
employers. Two of our interlocutors (one from the Ministry of Labour and one from the 
GSEE), for example, provided such an example: 
"There are hotels that during the winter months employ four to five employees, i.e. the 
managers. They sign a company level CA in winter, they hire fifty to sixty employees in 
the summer, and the CA signed by five people is imposed on the 60 and 70 [new 
employees]. Such abusive practices exist, but they are related to the specific deregulatory 
interventions that took place in recent years in collective bargaining". (Interviewee 
GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
In other cases, the wages agreed in such collective agreements may also be illegal, as 
they are below the level of the NMW: 
"We had a recent case where the company level CA that was signed [agreed on wages] 
that were below the NMW. As a matter of fact, this CA was submitted to the Ministry of 
Employment, was filed, and was uploaded on the Ministry's website, and it still appears 
there [at the time of the interview]" (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
 The above examples are indicative of the nature of the AoPs, which is such that 
effectively prohibits the conduct of free negotiations between the two parties. As the 
GSEE interviewee argued: 
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"We have very small businesses where the employees are the weak link, because I cannot 
imagine how in a company of 10-15 employees, where there is an everyday interaction 
with the employer, [the employees] at the company level could have the power and the 
ability to negotiate on equal terms a company level CA". (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
4.3. Determination and Level of Wages  
In addition to the issue of representation, the Troika was also concerned with the level 
of the wages that could be agreed. Law 4024/2011stipulated that although the wages 
agreed in a firm-level agreement could be lower than wages agreed in a sectoral 
agreement, they could not fall below the level of the NMW. Although the social 
partners had already agreed in a freezing of the NMW in the 2010 national collective 
agreement (standing at €751.39 for an inexperienced unskilled worker), in 2012 the 
government unilaterally decided to change the process of the NMW determination. Law 
4046/2012 and Act of Cabinet 6/2012 introduced the statutory regulation of the NMW, 
and also reduced its level by 22% for employees over the age of 25 (to €586.08), and 
by 32% for employees below the age of 25 (to €510.95). 
As one might expect, this policy was not totally embraced by the social partners. All of 
the peak employers’ associations argued for a return to the previous system of setting 
the minimum wage via free collective bargaining between representative associations. 
As the representative from SEV indicated: 
“The point on which we all agree is the return to the universality of the National General 
Collective Agreement (EGSSE), and by this we mean that the national minimum wage 
should be defined by the EGSSE. At the moment, this [universality] has changed with the 
latest legal framework; the minimum wage, if we were to set it at the national level by 
the EGSSE, would be applicable only to our members, whereas the national minimum 
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wage that is applicable to all the employees in the country is defined by the decision of 
the Ministry of Employment. The [proposed] system by which the minimum wage will be 
set has not started functioning yet. We have our reservations in relation to various issues, 
predominantly regarding how the advisory part will be structured, because it appears 
that the role of the social partners will be advisory and consultative.” (Interviewee SEV, 
29/7/2016) 
The importance of the role of the social partners under a proposed new system appears 
to be a critical objection to the proposed reforms and this reflects a broad consensus 
across both employer representatives and trade union representatives. As the SEV 
representative explains further: 
“… there is an advisory/consultative body, in which the social partners participate, 
along with higher education institutions, the Bank of Greece, and others. We suggest that 
this body should be comprised only by the social partners, who are signatories to the 
EGSSE and no-one else, because these are the representatives of Greek 
entrepreneurship, on the one hand, and the employees of the country, on the other. 
Everyone else should be able to provide evidence and data, but should not be able to 
provide an opinion or advise the State so as to set minimum wages.” (Interviewee SEV, 
29/7/2016) 
“The objections that have been put forward do not concern the whole system, but the 
part of that which suggests that the Minister engages into consultation with all the 
previous institutional actors that I mentioned.” (Interviewee SEV, 29/7/2016) 
Interestingly, other employers’ associations representing small and medium sized 
enterprises or commercial firms share this position.  As the representatives from the 
GSEVEE and ESSE suggested: 
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“The bold intervention of the state in 2012, under the pretext of [increasing] 
competitiveness and reducing unemployment, was mandated by the creditors and the 
interests of large corporations in the country. It did not bring the expected results. 
Besides, GSEVEE, also in their discussions with the then Prime Minister, Mr. Loukas 
Papademos, had categorically emphasised that it does not consent to the state 
intervention in [i.e. statutory regulation of] the national minimum wage and, in the words 
of the then President [of GSEVEE], declared to the Prime Minister, that, if the country 
is unable to guarantee €751, then it should formally declare bankruptcy, because in 
essence it is already bankrupt. We are requesting to return the wage-setting system to 
the social partners, taking into account the (economic) situation as it has developed.” 
(Interviewee GSEVEE, 4/8/2016). 
Although we will return to the question of the level of the minimum wage, the 
representative of ESEE has also argued along similar lines: 
“As far as the issue of free collective bargaining and the setting of the level of the 
minimum wage is concerned, you are very well aware of the fact that, when there was 
an agreement between the social partners, this agreement ended up with the competent 
Minister for a simple ratification. We request the restoration of this process, [we do] not 
[want] the setting of the level of the minimum wage by the creditors, and then the simple 
acceptance of this proposal by the competent Minister without the participation of the 
employers and employees. The EGSSE has, I believe, been based on this exact 
philosophy, to allow the existence of social dialogue, as it happens in most countries in 
Europe and even in Germany, where, as you said, there is no EGSSE, but there are 
sectoral agreements and free collective bargaining. I do not understand why we should 
not have this freedom of self-regulation of the market in our hands. I hold the view that 
no Minister and no government is fully aware of the real conditions of the market and is 
not able to make sense of them.” (Interviewee ESEE, 21/7/2016) 
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Finally, the consensus in favour of returning to the previous status quo of setting 
minimum wages by collective bargaining is shared by the representatives of employees: 
“Firstly, we have to make an acknowledgement. Since 1990, by the voting of the Law 
1876/1990 on free collective bargaining, this law has been one of the most democratic 
at the level of the European Union, which gives the opportunity to the social partners, 
either at the national level or at the industry-level or at the firm-level, to negotiate among 
themselves and agree the terms and conditions of work. […] There was no problem with 
the implementation of this law, which was embraced by all social partners. Admittedly, 
there were some irregularities or abnormalities, as it may happen with the 
implementation of any legal framework, and we would have been open, if we were invited 
to a discussion on the improvement of this legal framework” (Interviewee GSEE, 
30/8/2016).  
“Now, as far as the role of the state is concerned: the state may have the role of the 
regulator; [setting] the rules of the game, but it cannot, however, be the actor who 
imposes the decisions, who intervenes for the minimum wage and will set the minimum 
wage. And here there is a contradiction, which is why I spoke before about ideological 
obsessions. On the one hand, we speak about free markets, liberal economy, for 
enterprises and an economy that is not subject to restrictions, and, on the other hand, we 
are heading towards something that is totally different from what we assert, we are 
heading towards the imposition of state decisions, which should have been taken by the 
players who are part of this game. The state is not just undertaking the role of the 
arbitrator, but functions as an authoritarian state by changing all the rules of the game, 
especially in the collective agreements. (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
It transpires from the interviews that there is a mistrust towards the role of the state by 
all social partners. This mistrust is best explained historically, as a residue of the way 
that ‘state corporatism’ has operated in Greece. In an unusual degree of consensus 
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among social partners, all key actors required the minimum wages to be set freely by 
them without any state intervention. They justify this on the “logic of appropriateness”: 
they are better informed about the labour market, and thus, better placed to set the 
minimum wage. They are open (for instance SEV) to accept data and evidence from 
other actors (academics, Bank of Greece, etc.). But the bottom line is that they want to 
be the ones who set the minimum wage. 
More broadly, there are some delicate differences in the details around minimum 
wages, outlined above, but all social partners seem open to improvements of the wage 
setting framework. Additionally, the fault lines do not fully follow the binary logic of 
employers being pro-reform vs. trade unions’ being anti-reform. Instead, 
representatives of small and medium sized firms and commerce (GSEVEE and ESEE) 
are more critical of the reforms than representatives of large firms (SEV). 
The reaction of the social partners towards the effectiveness of this policy was more 
ambivalent than one might expect. Our discussant from the ESEE, for example, was 
very sceptical about the efficacy of the reduction of the NMW in boosting 
competitiveness and tackling unemployment. As he claimed: 
"It must be understood, as is also demonstrated by the trajectory of the changes, through 
very aggressive interventions in employment relations, that the result was negative, both 
with regard to unemployment and insofar as the competitiveness of Greek enterprises is 
concerned. As a matter of fact, within a year, our country dropped six places and is now 
in the 62nd place with regard to competitiveness, a fact that does not confirm the theory 
that wage reductions and employment flexibility will act to contain the level of 
unemployment" (Interviewee ESEE, 21/7/2016). 
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A similar perception was broadly shared both by the GSEVEE and the GSEE, and by 
our interviewees from the Ministry of Labour who, referring to the effect of the 32% 
reduction in the NMW on the unemployment levels of young employees (i.e. below the 
age of 25), stated that:  
"It does not appear [i.e. the reduction in the NMW] to have any significant impact, 
especially on young employees below the age of 25, for whom a lower NMW threshold 
exists. Unemployment for them is high and it does not appear to have been influenced by 
the level of wage".  (Interviewee Ministry of Labour, 29/7/2016). 
A common thread linking the employers’ associations with the GSEE was their view 
that the current level of the NMW is quite low and needs to be increased; where they 
differed, however, was on the specific level that it should reach. ESEE, for instance, 
argued for a gradual re-instatement of the NMW to the pre-crisis levels (i.e. 751 euros), 
whereas GSEVEE and SEV argued that, although the NMW should be determined 
through tripartite collective bargaining, its precise level could not be determined in 
advance but should be related to the actual conditions of the market.  
The decision, in 2012, to determine the NMW via statutory regulation was, as one could 
expect, negatively received by the social partners. Although one could attribute their 
reactions to the fact that this measure led to a reduction of their relative power in the 
industrial relations arena (since the determination of the NMW was one of their primary 
functions), in reality the feeling expressed during the interviews was one of resentment: 
by passing the determination of the NMW on to the political sphere, the social partners 
felt that the Troika (and, by extent, the state) did not trust their ability to effectively 
regulate the labour market. As our GSEE interviewee put it: 
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"In 2010, in the midst of the MoU and the county's commitments, the social partners 
decided that the mixture of economic policy was not the one that the labour market 
needed and we signed the 3-year National Collective Agreement, which provided for 
wage increases at the level of the European inflation every year (1%). Why did we do 
this? Because we really wanted to send a positive message to the market and the private 
[sector of the] economy. We are all aware that an important part of the crisis is 
psychological. We wanted to send a positive message. I do not think that, taking into 
consideration the historical trajectory and the experience of the social partners, we are 
not aware of what is in the best interests of our members, be they employers or 
employees, and that we need somebody to impose on us some things, because they believe 
they know better than us what is in our interest. I think that we, who move in the market, 
either as employees or employers, or entrepreneurs or self-employed, we know much 
better how to regulate this market" (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
The statutory regulation of the NMW was, therefore, interpreted not only as an attack 
on the collective autonomy of the social partners and on free collective bargaining, but 
also – and perhaps even more importantly – as a questioning of the social partners’ 
position as trustworthy and responsible interlocutors in the industrial relations arena. 
Again, our GSEE interviewee stressed this perception very clearly: 
"In 2012, and while the National Collective Agreement that the social partners had 
signed in 2010 was still in force, the state steps in after pressure from the creditors, and 
with the 6th Ministerial Council Decree effectively annuls the agreement. The social 
partners, that is, have signed an agreement, they know perfectly well what they have 
signed and what they have negotiated, and then comes the state to tell them, without 
wanting to go into detail about the pressures the government was facing at that period, 
that they do not know what their interest is and what they sign. Therefore, with a 
Ministerial Council Decree [the government] deregulates, it abolishes the current 
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framework of free collective bargaining, it also abolishes the NMW that has been agreed, 
and from 751 euros brings it down to 586 euros. This happened under the pretext of 
improving competitiveness and creating new jobs". (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
The issue of trust notwithstanding, the statutory determination of the NMW (and its 
subsequent reduction) also served the important function of indirectly reducing the 
level of sectoral wages. Traditionally, sectoral and occupational wage increases were 
linked not only to the level of the NMW but also to the specific percentage that the 
NMW had increased by in the latest national collective agreement. This linkage created 
inflationary phenomena, as some of our interlocutors admitted: 
"First of all, those who argue that there was an inflationary tendency in the [wage 
determination] of the sectoral agreements have a point. In Greece a bad practice existed, 
and we, the social partners, shared in it, according to which there was a direct link 
between increases in the sectoral CA and the increases that were provided in the national 
CA. [This practice] had the opposite result on the NMW. In other words, the NMW 
increased by 5%, the sectoral CA, either at the negotiations stage or at the mediation 
and arbitration stage, took as a base the increase in the NMW, and the negotiation 
started for a level above the 5% of the national collective agreement. This created an 
inflationary tendency. Of course, this was also a rationale shared by the employers 
before the crisis, who could very easily pass any increase in the NMW or the sectoral 
wage on to the consumer. That this was a bad practice is not something that we 
discovered now because of the crisis, we had already confronted it in an OMED 
conference in 2010". (Interviewee GSEVEE, 4/8/2016). 
A similar view was also shared by our OMED interviewee: 
"The parties were coming to OMED and, premised on the percentage [of increase] 
agreed in the national CA asked for additional increases through the sectoral CA. In this 
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way an internal revaluation effectively took place, [which was] contrary to any economic 
logic with a hard euro. If this had not been realised in 2009 or 2010, it should have been 
realised in 2012 and the devaluation should have taken place … if the NMW was 
following the Greek inflation it would have been around 600 euros". (Interviewee 
OMED, 21/7/2016). 
In contrast, the GSEE representative presented an alternative logic that linked the 
increases in wages to the growth of the respective sectors: 
"With regard to the inflationary tendencies, I would say that the average of the increases 
we were discussing during the good times was around the level of inflation; we were 
actually negotiating to pay the level of inflation or, in some sectors where there was 
growth and high productivity, there was something more in the agreement. It never 
exceeded the indices of the growth in productivity however. Let me remind you of the 
swift growth of the Greek economy from the beginning of 2000 where, for at least eight 
years, we had a rapid increase of the financial results of businesses and an increase in 
productivity rates which was very high [in comparison with] the EU [averages]. 
Therefore, what the employees did was to negotiate increases, under extreme difficulties 
and objections, with a view to receiving a part of this increase in the GDP. There was 
not something truly outrageous with regard to the employees". (Interviewee GSEE, 
30/8/2016). 
The level of the minimum wage and the relationship between the NMW increases and 
productivity growth merits a thorough analysis that goes beyond the aims of this paper. 
Still, it is possible to attempt a brief examination of the available data with a view to 
gauging how this relationship has played out in the Greek context. The usual measure 
of the level of the minimum wage for comparative purposes is the Kaitz index, 
presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Minimum wage level in selected countries (Kaitz index). 
 2008 2015 
Greece 0.48 0.47 
France 0.63 0.62 
Germany - 0.48 
Ireland 0.52 0.44 
Portugal 0.49 0.57 
Spain 0.39 0.37 
UK 0.46 0.49 
Source: OECD.Stat, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed on 18/01/2017). Notes: The 
Kaitz index calculates the ratio of minimum wages to median earnings of full-time employees. 
The Kaitz index essentially measures the “bite” of the minimum wage by calculating 
the ratio of the minimum to the median (or average) wage. A relatively high minimum 
wage can be observed in France, while a relatively low one is observed in Spain. Greece 
is somewhere in the middle of the ranking, both in 2008 and in 2015, with a bite of the 
minimum similar to that in Germany and the UK. The large decline in the minimum 
wage in the post-2012 period is not reflected in the data presented due to, first, a sharp 
increase in the Kaitz index during 2010-2011, and, second, the equally significant (but 
more gradual) decline in the median wage.  
This evolution is shown in Figure 1, along with a longer-term decline in the Kaitz index 
since the beginning of the ‘90s, resulting from the wage moderation exhibited by the 
social partners negotiating the national collective agreement.  
Figure 1 The evolution of the minimum wage in Greece (Kaitz index)  
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Source: OECD.Stat, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed on 18/01/2017). Notes: The Kaitz index 
here is the ratio of minimum wages to median earnings of full-time employees. 
This moderation is also evident in Figure 2. The real value of the minimum wage since 
2000 is plotted there alongside the contemporaneous evolution in the level of 
productivity. Up to 2007, we can observe relatively lower increases in the real 
minimum wage relative to the growth in productivity.5 Obviously, the social partners 
adopted a cautious approach to minimum wage setting, avoiding “excessive” increases. 
In contrast, some apparent “rigidity” in the system is evident during the years 2008-
2010, in a period when productivity was declining rapidly while the minimum wage 
remained relatively stable.  
Figure 2 Real minimum wages and productivity in Greece (2000=100) 
                                                 
5 Extending the calculations back to the ‘90s (not shown in Figure 2) also reveals that, while productivity 
grew by 13 per cent during that decade, the real value of the annual minimum earnings remained stable. 
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Source: Real minimum wage from OECD.Stat, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed on 
13/10/2016); productivity from AMECO database (series RVGDE), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm (accessed on 13/10/2016). Notes: 
2000=100; “Real minimum wage” is the annual minimum wage of full-time employees in 2014 constant prices at 
2014 US dollar PPPs. “Productivity” is real GDP per person employed.  
Hence, the increases in the real value of the minimum wage in Greece were in general 
(apart from the 2008-2010 period) in line with productivity growth. Moreover, the bite 
of the minimum wage cannot be considered restrictive by European standards.  
However, the Troika’s argument was different. The rationale for internal devaluation 
was the gradual decline in Greece’s competitiveness during its era of membership in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This decline was the result of excessive 
nominal wage increases that far outpaced productivity growth and led to an increase in 
unit labour costs (see Theodoropoulou, 2016). The real wage moderation revealed by 
the Figures above can be consistent with a decline in competitiveness as measured by 
the unit labour costs and probably explains the differing views among the social 
partners.  
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It must be apparent from the above discussion that there are more than one ways to 
interpret wage increases and their relationship to competitiveness. There may be 
different policy conclusions depending on the measures that one looks (e.g. unit labour 
costs), whereas the relationship between labour market institutions and competitiveness 
represents a ‘contested terrain’. 
Notwithstanding, the changes in the collective bargaining regulatory framework 
opened up the way for a steep decline in wages as a company was effectively free – at 
least in theory – to reduce its employees’ wages to the level of the (now greatly reduced) 
NMW without being restrained by any sectoral or occupational collective agreements. 
This could be achieved either by signing a firm-level agreement with the company trade 
union or the AoP or by unilaterally deciding to proceed as such (i.e. without collective 
bargaining). 
4.4. Employment Relations and the Greek Model of Production in Recession 
A common position shared by almost all of our interviewees was their staunch 
disagreement with many of the policies that were introduced in the preceding years. In 
their view, the deregulation of employment relations, combined with the harsh 
economic environment, has led to more problems than the ones it originally set out to 
resolve. As our GSEVEE interviewee argued: 
"The businesses have cumulatively lost, during the crisis, about 70-75% of their 
turnover. The biggest problem is unemployment, when almost 1.5 million of our fellow 
citizens are not employed, according to official data. In our view, this number is well 
above 1.5 million as, for example, merchants and craftsmen and their family members 
who assist them, companies that have shut down during the crisis – and according to 
data from the European Commission they are around 250.000 - are not registered 
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anywhere. The country's competitiveness was not helped by the reduction of the NMW. 
Greece, during the crisis years, lost, if I am not mistaken, about four places in global 
competitiveness. Let me remind you that in October 2011 unemployment in Greece was 
19,1%. Despite the interference with the NMW, unemployment exploded to 27%, it now 
stands at 25%. Of course, the flexible forms of employment and the seasonality of various 
occupations, as in the tourism sector, contributed to this reduction." (Interviewee 
GSEVEE, 4/8/2016) 
Our ESEE and GSEE interlocutors painted a similar picture, with slight modifications. 
In their view, the mixture of economic policies that were imposed on Greece further 
reinforced the vicious circle of economic decline. A case in point was the level of 
taxation and of non-wage costs that were deemed too high to be shouldered by small 
and medium enterprises. Yet, as the GSEE interviewee argued: 
"I think that the problem is neither taxation nor social security contributions. The 
problem is that the turnover of businesses has been significantly, dramatically I would 
say, shrunk. And since the turnover has been dramatically reduced everything is to 
blame. I would say that, even if a very generous provision was introduced that halved 
employers’ social security contributions or stipulated that for the following two years, 
because of the crisis, no employer would pay social security contributions, the companies 
would still be unable to cope, there would still be issues, flexible employment would still 
exist, exploitation would still exist". (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
The question of the country’s model of production and growth strategy emerged again 
and again in our discussions, pointing to the fact that the social partners were well aware 
of both the structural problems of the Greek economy and the need to address them 
collectively. Again, the GSEE interviewee was adamant about the need for a tripartite 
social dialogue that could set the bases for rebooting the economy: 
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"[t]he problem is not to regulate or deregulate free collective bargaining and suddenly, 
if we regulate or deregulate [collective bargaining], the private sector will start to 
function. We need to leave these issues a bit further behind, because we deal with them 
for 6 years now, and we have not sat down to consider how we can plan growth strategies 
together, which is what is needed, which will generate new jobs, which will increase 
businesses' revenues and the GDP, to envisage a different philosophy with a different 
strategy. We have not discussed this, we did not have the time, because all the time we 
are focusing on what we can deregulate." (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
This is not to say that the system of industrial relations, as it functioned prior to 2010, 
was flawless or in no need of fine-tuning. On the contrary, as was evident from the 
above discussions, the social partners had contrasting views regarding the functionality 
of several aspects of the system (such as the hierarchy of collective agreements, or the 
level of the NMW). However, almost all seemed to concur with two points: first, that 
the changes introduced in the employment relations system were not properly linked to 
a wider policy of economic rejuvenation and, second, that the drafting of any such 
policies (regarding both the production and the employment relations model of Greece) 
should have involved the social partners in one way or another. The external imposition 
of such policies by the Troika, with no proper social dialogue and without taking into 
consideration the experience and expertise of the social partners, resulted, according to 
our interviewees’ assessment, in adverse economic and social consequences. The 
underlying message that came out of all our discussions was that, if the country is to 
get back on a path of economic development, then the productive classes responsible 
for this should have the ability to engage into proper social dialogue and have the 
opportunity to decide among themselves the appropriate policy mixture. Trust, in this 
respect, is of the essence. 
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5. Conclusion 
The recent Eurozone crisis radically changed the approach adopted by the EU towards 
labour market reforms. Strictly speaking, national labour market frameworks remain a 
competence of the member-states. However, in recent years, as part of the process of 
the European Semester, the EU has been more active towards close monitoring of the 
implementation of structural reforms in the labour market, through National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) and Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs). The general 
direction of travel has been one towards decentralizing collective bargaining to improve 
the link between labour costs and productivity. 
Our review of relevant research suggests that the effects of alternative structures of 
collective bargaining on employment performance and competiveness are unclear, and 
the studies are overall inconclusive. Academic economists are quite cautious in the 
policy interpretation of their results, while trust among social partners appears to be just 
as important in bringing about macro flexibility at the structure of collective bargaining.  
In this policy context, the paper sought to delve deeper into the responses and 
perspectives of the social partners on the enforced changes in the regulation of 
collective bargaining. This analysis revealed some of the hidden fractures and fault 
lines between and within social partners.  
As far as collective bargaining centralization and decentralization are concerned, there 
is a variety of perspectives reflecting a “cherry-picking” approach with different actors 
giving primacy to different levels of collective bargaining. For instance, SEV was more 
favourable towards company-level agreements, with a complementary role envisaged 
for sectoral agreements. On the other side, GSEE was in favour of sectoral and 
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occupational agreements with a complementary role for company-level agreements. On 
the area of representation, the Association of Persons (AoPs) is one of the most 
controversial ‘innovations’ of the new regulatory framework. Although their rationale 
was to extend the reach of collective bargaining to small companies, in reality the AoPs 
seem to have functioned as a Trojan horse to drive decentralization of wage bargaining 
and internal devaluation. The trade unions’ side highlighted the fact that these structures 
appear to be predominantly employer-controlled. 
With regard to the setting of the national minimum wage, there appears to be consensus 
among actors. All of them support the return to the previous institutional framework 
and setting of the NMW by a national general collective agreement (EGSEE). The 
social partners, however, provided different perspectives when attempting to explain 
excessive wage increases in the past.  
The employers’ organizations argued that the previous system might have led to some 
inflationary pressures, whereas the trade union side suggested that the increases always 
followed inflation and productivity increases. The picture emerging from the data, 
suggests that real minimum wage increases were in line with productivity and prices up 
until 2009, and there is only a two-year period during which said increases were above 
productivity and inflation. However, the real wage moderation revealed by our data can 
be consistent with a decline in competitiveness as measured by the unit labour costs 
(that are calculated based on nominal wages) and probably explains the differing views 
among the social partners.  
Finally, all social partners highlighted the importance of overcoming the recession and 
modernizing the model of production in Greece, emphasizing that some of the key 
problems are not resolved by structural reforms and downward wage adjustment.  
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To conclude, the analysis suggests that the fault lines between and within social partners 
have been more nuanced and complex than expected. The employers’ side was not 
wholeheartedly in favour of the imposed market-friendly and pro-business reforms. 
Vice versa, the trade unions’ side was not straightforwardly against any change or 
against a potential recalibration of the system, and accepted that there were 
dysfunctional components in the previous system. 
Two additional key themes transpired from this exploration: first, a distrust towards the 
state, and second, scepticism towards technocratic solutions. On the one hand, the social 
actors were not really confident that the state would best serve the interests of their 
members. For instance, all social partners agreed on the need to return to the previous 
system. They insisted that they have the best knowledge of labour market conditions to 
determine minimum wages, so this should fall within their remit.  
Scepticism towards technocracy was also evident in the discourse of the key actors. 
Although there was no ‘shared understanding’ of key actors with regard to the overall 
shape of the wage bargaining system and its distinctive features, the common thread is 
that none of the social partners fully supported the current direction of institutional 
change in the wage-setting system. 
Overall, the paper highlighted some of the contradictions of the recent policy reforms 
in wage setting. Although the institutional changes were supposed to be carried out in 
the spirit of social partnership (following on from EU best practices) the fact of the 
matter was that there was little consultation in the process and eventually the 
institutional changes were imposed on the basis of typical financial conditionality.  
 
 35 
References 
Agell, J. (1999). On the benefits from rigid labour markets: Norms, market failures and 
social insurance. Economic Journal, 109(453): F143-F164. 
Aidt, T. and Tzannatos, Z. (2002). Unions and Collective Bargaining: Economic Effects 
in a Global Environment. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Altomonte, C., di Mauro, F. and Osbat, C. (2013). Going Beyond Labour Costs: How 
and Why “Structural” and Micro-Based Factors Can Help Explaining Export 
Performance. CompNet Policy Brief 01/2013, European Central Bank.  
Baccaro, L. and Rei, D. (2007). Institutional determinants of unemployment in OECD 
countries: Does the deregulatory view hold water? International Organization, 
61: 527-569. 
Baker, D., Glyn, A., Howell, D. and Schmitt, J. (2005). Labor market institutions and 
unemployment: A critical assessment of the cross-country evidence. In Howell, 
D. (ed.), Fighting Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Blanchard, O., Jaumotte, F. and Loungani, P. (2014). Labor market policies and IMF 
advice in advanced economies during the Great Recession. IZA Journal of Labor 
Policy, 3(2).  
Boeri, T., and van Ours, J. (2013). The economics of imperfect labor markets. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 36 
Campos Lima, M. and Artiles, A. M. (2011) ‘Crisis and trade union challenges in 
Portugal and Spain: between general strikes and social pacts’ Transfer 17(3): 
387–402. 
Christopoulou, R. and Monastiriotis, V. (2014), The Greek Public Sector Wage 
Premium before the Crisis: Size, Selection and Relative Valuation of 
Characteristics. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 52: 579–602. 
Clasen, J., Clegg, D. and Kvist, J. (2012). European labour market policies in (the) 
crisis ETUI working papers series. Brussels: ETUI. 
Clauwaert, S. (2014). The country-specific recommendations (CSRs) in the social field. 
An overview and comparison Update including the CSRs 2014–2015. ETUI 
working papers series. Brussels: ETUI. 
Dafermos, Y. and Nikolaidi, M. (2012). How can Greece’s trade balance be improved? 
Observatory of Economic and Social Developments, Labour Institute, Greek 
General Confederation of Labour (in Greek). 
Daouli, J., Demoussis, M., Giannakopoulos, N. and Laliotis, I. (2013), Firm-Level 
Collective Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition 
Analysis. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 51: 80–103.  
Decramer, S., Fuss, C. and Konings, J. (2016). How Do Exporters React to Changes in 
Cost Competitiveness? The World Economy, 39(10): 1558-1583.  
Fagerberg, J. (1988). International competitiveness. Economic Journal, 98(391): 355–
374.  
 37 
Fagerberg, J. (1996). Technology and competitiveness. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 12(3): 39–51. 
Fagerberg, J., Srholec, M. and Knell, M. (2007). The Competitiveness of Nations: Why 
Some Countries Prosper While Others Fall Behind. World Development, 35(10): 
1595-1620.  
Freeman, R. and Medoff, J. (1984). What do unions do? New York: Basic Books.  
Geary, J. (2016). Economic crisis, austerity and trade union responses: The Irish case 
in comparative perspective. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 22(2): 
131-147.  
Gregg, P. and Manning, A. (1997). Labour market regulation and unemployment. In 
Snower, D. J. and de la Dehesa, G. (eds), Unemployment Policy: Government 
Options for the Labour Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Heyes J and Lewis P (2014) Employment protection under fire: Labour market 
deregulation and employment in the European Union. Economic and Industrial 
Democracy 35(4): 587–607. 
Howell, D. (2005). Unemployment and labor market institutions: An assessment. In 
Howell, D. (ed.), Fighting Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Howell, D., Baker, D., Glyn, A. and Schmitt, J. (2007). Are protective labour market 
institutions at the root of unemployment? A critical review of the evidence. 
Capitalism and Society, 2(1): 1-71.  
 38 
Ioannou, Christos A. (2012) ‘Recasting Greek Industrial Relations: Internal 
Devaluation in Light of the Economic Crisis and European Integration’. The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
28(2): 199–222. 
Karamessini, M. (2012) ‘Sovereign Debt Crisis: an Opportunity to Complete the 
Neoliberal Project and Dismantle the Greek Employment model’ in Lehndorff, S. 
(ed.) A Triumph of Failed Ideas: European Models of Capitalism in the Crisis, 
Brussels: ETUI, pp. 155-181. 
Kornelakis A. (2016), Inclusion or Dualization? The Political Economy of Employment 
Relations in Italian and Greek Telecommunications. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 54: 385–408. 
Kornelakis, A. and Voskeritsian, H. (2014) The transformation of employment 
regulation in Greece: towards a dysfunctional liberal market economy? Relations 
industrielles / Industrial Relations, 69(2): 344-65. 
Koukiadaki, A. and Kokkinou, C. (2016) Deconstructing the Greek System of 
Industrial Relations European Journal of Industrial Relations 22(3): 205-219. 
Koukiadaki, A. and Kretsos, L. (2012). Opening Pandora’s box: The sovereign debt 
crisis and labour market regulation in Greece. Industrial Law Journal, 41(3): 276-
304. 
Kretsos, L. and Vogiatzoglou, M. (2015) "Lost in the Ocean of Deregulation?" 
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations 70(2): 218–239. 
 39 
Molina, O. (2014) Self-regulation and the state in industrial relations in Southern 
Europe: Back to the future? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 20(1): 21–
36. 
Mosher, J. S. and Trubek, D. M. (2003), Alternative Approaches to Governance in the 
EU: EU Social Policy and the European Employment Strategy. JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 41: 63–88. 
Pedersini, R. and Regini, M. (2014) ‘Coping with the crisis in Italy: Employment 
relations and social dialogue amid recession’ in K. Papadakis & Y. Ghellab (eds.) 
The governance of policy reforms in southern Europe and Ireland Geneva: ILO, 
pp.109-126. 
Rosário Palma Ramalho, Maria do. (2014) ‘Portuguese labour law and relations during 
the crisis’ in K. Papadakis & Y. Ghellab (eds.) The governance of policy reforms 
in southern Europe and Ireland Geneva: ILO, pp.87-108. 
Theodoropoulou, S. (2016). Severe pain, very little gain: internal devaluation and rising 
unemployment in Greece. In Myant M., Theodoropoulou, S. and Piasna, A. 
(eds.), Unemployment, internal devaluation and labour market deregulation in 
Europe. Brussels: ETUI.  
Wood, Geoffrey, Leslie T. Szamosi, Alexandros Psychogios, Sofoklis Sarvanidis, and 
Dialechti Fotopoulou (2015) ‘Rethinking Greek Capitalism through the Lens of 
Industrial Relations Reform: A View until the 2015 Referendum’ Relations 
industrielles / Industrial Relations, 70(4): 698-717. 
